Past Events
Locality of Reason Lectures
Locality of Reason Lectures
Dr. Onni Hirvonen
Dr. Onni Hirvonen
(Senior Researcher at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy in University of Jyväskylä, Finland.)
(Senior Researcher at the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy in University of Jyväskylä, Finland.)
From Local to Universal Reasons for Recognition
From Local to Universal Reasons for Recognition
June 2, 2023
June 2, 2023
10:30 AM (CET)
10:30 AM (CET)
Room 102
Room 102
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
Warsaw, Poland
Warsaw, Poland
Meeting ID: 922 8691 2003
Meeting ID: 922 8691 2003
Code: 432495
Code: 432495
Abstract: Since the foundational work of Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor in early 1990s, contemporary recognition theory has established itself as a multi-faceted research programme in social and political philosophy. Recognition-theorists have convincingly argued that our intersubjective relations have a key role in constituting us as rational autonomous persons, and that even our self-understanding of ourselves is largely dependent on our relations to others. In short, recognition is a central concept related to human sociality – it ranges from the personal constitution of individuals, into political spheres in the forms of social and political struggles for recognition. Recognition is also often invoked in the context of identity-political struggles.
Abstract: Since the foundational work of Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor in early 1990s, contemporary recognition theory has established itself as a multi-faceted research programme in social and political philosophy. Recognition-theorists have convincingly argued that our intersubjective relations have a key role in constituting us as rational autonomous persons, and that even our self-understanding of ourselves is largely dependent on our relations to others. In short, recognition is a central concept related to human sociality – it ranges from the personal constitution of individuals, into political spheres in the forms of social and political struggles for recognition. Recognition is also often invoked in the context of identity-political struggles.
Although the centrality of recognition is well acknowledged, the theoretical literature is torn in its views of how shared or universalizable the needs and claims for recognition are. On the one hand, recognition is commonly taken to be an institutionally mediated normative response to others. It gets historically developing forms which are tied to the actual local institutions (e.g. family, markets, civil society) of a particular time. On the other hand, recognition is seen as a universal human need (Taylor) or a quasi-transcendental feature of human life form (Honneth). As recently argued by Heikki Ikäheimo (2022), recognition could be understood as something that is a universal or an essential part of human life, and thus extending beyond its mere local realizations. However, it is partly unclear how these anthropologically grounded forms of recognition would inform the cultural or identity-political struggles for recognition, or how they would fit together with the so-called fact of plurality and differing views of good life.
Although the centrality of recognition is well acknowledged, the theoretical literature is torn in its views of how shared or universalizable the needs and claims for recognition are. On the one hand, recognition is commonly taken to be an institutionally mediated normative response to others. It gets historically developing forms which are tied to the actual local institutions (e.g. family, markets, civil society) of a particular time. On the other hand, recognition is seen as a universal human need (Taylor) or a quasi-transcendental feature of human life form (Honneth). As recently argued by Heikki Ikäheimo (2022), recognition could be understood as something that is a universal or an essential part of human life, and thus extending beyond its mere local realizations. However, it is partly unclear how these anthropologically grounded forms of recognition would inform the cultural or identity-political struggles for recognition, or how they would fit together with the so-called fact of plurality and differing views of good life.
This contribution aims to clarify what the locality and historicity of recognition exactly mean, and what are their effects for the political side of recognition paradigm. Reasons for recognition are normative reasons, but how historical, localized, or universalizable are they? In this paper I argue that both, universalists/essentialists and historicists/localists, get something right about the nature of recognition. However, recognition theories need a clearer (social ontological) understanding of institutions of recognition and institutional mediation of recognition to make proper sense of the relations of the universal needs of recognition to the localized claims for recognition.
This contribution aims to clarify what the locality and historicity of recognition exactly mean, and what are their effects for the political side of recognition paradigm. Reasons for recognition are normative reasons, but how historical, localized, or universalizable are they? In this paper I argue that both, universalists/essentialists and historicists/localists, get something right about the nature of recognition. However, recognition theories need a clearer (social ontological) understanding of institutions of recognition and institutional mediation of recognition to make proper sense of the relations of the universal needs of recognition to the localized claims for recognition.
This paper also critically evaluates the merits of various attempts to overcome locality or historicity of recognition. Extending (local) spheres of recognition to include ever broader number of people has been seen as a moral progress (Honneth 1995). However, it is questionable whether the Hegelian concept of recognition includes in itself such conceptual elements, which would make this extension necessary. Although reciprocity and equality of recognition might be required in the case of two individuals relating to each other, it is unclear whether such a claim can be made on the level of cultural and political struggles.
This paper also critically evaluates the merits of various attempts to overcome locality or historicity of recognition. Extending (local) spheres of recognition to include ever broader number of people has been seen as a moral progress (Honneth 1995). However, it is questionable whether the Hegelian concept of recognition includes in itself such conceptual elements, which would make this extension necessary. Although reciprocity and equality of recognition might be required in the case of two individuals relating to each other, it is unclear whether such a claim can be made on the level of cultural and political struggles.
In this paper I argue that recognition theories might lose some of Hegel’s original normative insights about reciprocity when they move from a simple dyadic relationship into relationships within and between groups. Even if recognition constitutes us, it seems that we do not need full recognition from everyone but rather just enough recognition to be able to constitute and upkeep a sufficient level of self-certainty. To compensate for the loss of “necessary” reciprocity of recognition in more intimate and local contexts, universalizing claims need to rely on imagination and moral education ( see e.g. Ikäheimo 2022). This paper analyses the normative weight that the universalized claims for recognition have – and the potential loss of critical leverage that might come with shifting from local, more demanding, forms of recognition into universal recognition.
In this paper I argue that recognition theories might lose some of Hegel’s original normative insights about reciprocity when they move from a simple dyadic relationship into relationships within and between groups. Even if recognition constitutes us, it seems that we do not need full recognition from everyone but rather just enough recognition to be able to constitute and upkeep a sufficient level of self-certainty. To compensate for the loss of “necessary” reciprocity of recognition in more intimate and local contexts, universalizing claims need to rely on imagination and moral education ( see e.g. Ikäheimo 2022). This paper analyses the normative weight that the universalized claims for recognition have – and the potential loss of critical leverage that might come with shifting from local, more demanding, forms of recognition into universal recognition.
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Locality of Reason Lectures
Locality of Reason Lectures
Prof. Paolo Valore
Prof. Paolo Valore
(Università degli Studi di Milano)
(Università degli Studi di Milano)
Apriority and Relativity in the Theoretical and Ontological Presuppositions for Identity
Apriority and Relativity in the Theoretical and Ontological Presuppositions for Identity
April 14, 2023
April 14, 2023
10:30 AM (CET)
10:30 AM (CET)
Room 102
Room 102
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
Warsaw, Poland
Warsaw, Poland
Abstract: A recent and promising innovative approach in contemporary ontology is an improved accounting of the often hidden metaphysical, background presuppositions of taxonomies and categorizations in our sciences (Xu et al. 2022; Valore 2016). This approach aims to disclose the a priori, but contextual, assumptions that give sense to the formal frameworks of our theories (Valore 2017b, Valore 2018). The set of contextual a priori presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what it is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the effect of selection preferences in building the correct classes of objects.
Abstract: A recent and promising innovative approach in contemporary ontology is an improved accounting of the often hidden metaphysical, background presuppositions of taxonomies and categorizations in our sciences (Xu et al. 2022; Valore 2016). This approach aims to disclose the a priori, but contextual, assumptions that give sense to the formal frameworks of our theories (Valore 2017b, Valore 2018). The set of contextual a priori presuppositions involve, among others, the identification of relevant properties for the objects of our domain as a guiding principle in uncovering what it is to be considered intrinsic and what could be the effect of selection preferences in building the correct classes of objects.
How we can select the meaningful ways of carving up the world and reject arbitrary ways of grouping things? The assumption according to which the taxa recognized by different systems of classification may be natural in different respects and the impact of intentions and goals when we organize a plurality of data in genera and species seem confirmed by recent research in experimental psychology on the effects of previous beliefs on categorization tasks (Rehder & Hastie 2001; Ahn & Kim 2000; Benitez et al. in press). Nonetheless, the acknowledgment of the relativity of categories in itself risks to underestimate the relevance of the set of a priori principles and categories that are not included in our data and are an indispensable component of the human reason.
How we can select the meaningful ways of carving up the world and reject arbitrary ways of grouping things? The assumption according to which the taxa recognized by different systems of classification may be natural in different respects and the impact of intentions and goals when we organize a plurality of data in genera and species seem confirmed by recent research in experimental psychology on the effects of previous beliefs on categorization tasks (Rehder & Hastie 2001; Ahn & Kim 2000; Benitez et al. in press). Nonetheless, the acknowledgment of the relativity of categories in itself risks to underestimate the relevance of the set of a priori principles and categories that are not included in our data and are an indispensable component of the human reason.
The approach we are testing echoes the fundamental Kantian intuition presented in The Critique of Judgment, according to which aims and purposes play an essential role in discovering similarity in Nature, and in general in a given set of data and can be considered an acknowledgment of the “locality” of the a priori principles of our understanding of Nature. These a priori principles of our reason are rooted in psychological, anthropological, and cultural dimensions of human knowledge and linked to different interests and goals and, nonetheless, they are not arbitrary. Understanding the ramifications of this position can facilitate the mutual understanding across theories, research fields, and even generations and communities. Applications in this sense have already been tested in several fields: questioning, together with a team of astrophysicists, the metaphysical and ontological presuppositions of such notions as kinds and similarity in cosmology (Valore et al. 2020), addressing the notion of relevant property and kinds of patients in bio medical sciences (Valore 2017b), and in an ongoing research at the Department of Psychology of Columbia University about the ontological presuppositions for the notion of personal identity in psychology.
The approach we are testing echoes the fundamental Kantian intuition presented in The Critique of Judgment, according to which aims and purposes play an essential role in discovering similarity in Nature, and in general in a given set of data and can be considered an acknowledgment of the “locality” of the a priori principles of our understanding of Nature. These a priori principles of our reason are rooted in psychological, anthropological, and cultural dimensions of human knowledge and linked to different interests and goals and, nonetheless, they are not arbitrary. Understanding the ramifications of this position can facilitate the mutual understanding across theories, research fields, and even generations and communities. Applications in this sense have already been tested in several fields: questioning, together with a team of astrophysicists, the metaphysical and ontological presuppositions of such notions as kinds and similarity in cosmology (Valore et al. 2020), addressing the notion of relevant property and kinds of patients in bio medical sciences (Valore 2017b), and in an ongoing research at the Department of Psychology of Columbia University about the ontological presuppositions for the notion of personal identity in psychology.
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Prof. Dr. Thomas Sturm
Prof. Dr. Thomas Sturm
(ICREA & Autonomous University of Barcelona)
(ICREA & Autonomous University of Barcelona)
Reason in Hume’s ‘Science of Man’ versus Kant’s ‘Pragmatic Anthropology’
Reason in Hume’s ‘Science of Man’ versus Kant’s ‘Pragmatic Anthropology’
January 13, 2023
January 13, 2023
10:30 AM (CET)
10:30 AM (CET)
Room 102
Room 102
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
Warsaw, Poland
Warsaw, Poland
Meeting ID: 941 8647 4563
Meeting ID: 941 8647 4563
Passcode: 048247
Passcode: 048247
Abstract: Comparisons of Hume’s and Kant’s theories of practical reason usually focus on their function for ethical theorizing: Can reason determine which practical goals we ought to realize from a moral point of view? Famously, Kant claims that it can, whereas Hume denies it, ascribing to reason a merely instrumental function. In this talk, I focus on the functions of Hume’s and Kant’s accounts of practical reason for the empirical human sciences. I first address some mostly insignificant similarities between their views (part I) and then turn to significant dissimilarities (part II). In the latter part, I show how Kant’s account is superior to Hume’s instrumentalism in three ways: (1) for purposes of empirical action-explanation, Kant’s account of hypothetical imperatives more fine-grained than Hume’s instrumentalism; (2) the specific concept of pragmatic reason presents a better understanding of how descriptive and normative aspects of action are connected from the agent’s points of view; and (3) pragmatic reason helps to show how the human sciences are related to idea(l)s of human progress, such as cosmopolitanism.
Abstract: Comparisons of Hume’s and Kant’s theories of practical reason usually focus on their function for ethical theorizing: Can reason determine which practical goals we ought to realize from a moral point of view? Famously, Kant claims that it can, whereas Hume denies it, ascribing to reason a merely instrumental function. In this talk, I focus on the functions of Hume’s and Kant’s accounts of practical reason for the empirical human sciences. I first address some mostly insignificant similarities between their views (part I) and then turn to significant dissimilarities (part II). In the latter part, I show how Kant’s account is superior to Hume’s instrumentalism in three ways: (1) for purposes of empirical action-explanation, Kant’s account of hypothetical imperatives more fine-grained than Hume’s instrumentalism; (2) the specific concept of pragmatic reason presents a better understanding of how descriptive and normative aspects of action are connected from the agent’s points of view; and (3) pragmatic reason helps to show how the human sciences are related to idea(l)s of human progress, such as cosmopolitanism.
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PD Dr. Jens Lemanski
PD Dr. Jens Lemanski
(University of Münster, Fernuniversität Hagen)
(University of Münster, Fernuniversität Hagen)
Rationality of the Nonconceptual
Rationality of the Nonconceptual
October 21, 2022
October 21, 2022
11:30 AM (CET)
11:30 AM (CET)
AULA 116 (Ossowskiej)
AULA 116 (Ossowskiej)
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
UW Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
Warsaw, Poland
Warsaw, Poland
Abstract: Modern philosophy is dominated by the rationalist view that the space of reasons is not wider than the logical space of concepts. Non-conceptual representations are thus mostly banished from contemporary philosophy. In the lecture, however, this belief will be contradicted and an argument will be made for a rational theory of representation. Four questions will be discussed: 1) What is rationality? 2) What are representations? 3) What are concepts and what is the non-conceptual? 4) What are reasons? In this discussion it turns out that today the dominant schools all start from a basic conviction that one does not have to share.
Abstract: Modern philosophy is dominated by the rationalist view that the space of reasons is not wider than the logical space of concepts. Non-conceptual representations are thus mostly banished from contemporary philosophy. In the lecture, however, this belief will be contradicted and an argument will be made for a rational theory of representation. Four questions will be discussed: 1) What is rationality? 2) What are representations? 3) What are concepts and what is the non-conceptual? 4) What are reasons? In this discussion it turns out that today the dominant schools all start from a basic conviction that one does not have to share.
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Tommaso Ostillio, MSc
Tommaso Ostillio, MSc
(Department of Economics, Kozminski University and
(Department of Economics, Kozminski University and
Department of Modern Philosophy, University of Warsaw)
Department of Modern Philosophy, University of Warsaw)
The Philosophy of dumbness: a philosophical romance about rationality
The Philosophy of dumbness: a philosophical romance about rationality
25 March 2022
25 March 2022
11:00 AM (CET)
11:00 AM (CET)
Abstract: In his Intellectuals and Society (2010, Chap. 11, p. 160), the great American Economist and Political Philosopher Thomas Sowell famously writes: "the seeming sophistication of the notion that all reality is "socially constructed" has a superficial plausibility but it ignores the various validation processes which test those constructions. Much of what is said to be socially "constructed" has been in fact socially evolved over the generations and socially validated by experience. Much of what many among the intelligentsia propose to replace it with is in fact constructed—that is, created deliberately at a given time and place—and with no validation beyond the consensus of like-minded peers. If facts, logic, and scientific procedures are all just arbitrary "socially constructed" notions, then all that is left is consensus—more specifically peer consensus, the kind of consensus that matters to adolescents or to many among the intelligentsia". If we replace the word intelligentsia with the word philosophers in the above quotation, we might get a sense of how and why philosophy has stopped being a trendsetter and has instead become only an academic business much detached from the reality of human affairs. Philosophy practitioners well know that the linguistic and the propositional attitudes turns have drifted philosophy away from a more fundamental research question that Modern Philosophers relentlessly tackled, i.e., what makes our beliefs sound and justified? And what does not? Consequently, much of contemporary Philosophy became a relentless debate rotating around the idea that logic alone validates our beliefs. This lecture aims to resume the guiding research question of Modern Philosophy by approaching it in a non-philosophical manner. More precisely, this lecture reports some seminal findings in Behavioral and Experimental Economics having devastating effects on the view that logic is a belief validator. In fact, although philosophers believe that logic alone drives our everyday beliefs and intentions, the latter literature instead shows that our everyday beliefs and intentions are often deadly traps that lead us into fooling ourselves. Therefore, as a means for rule-based reasoning, logic appears somewhat scarce in our everyday decision-making and mundane knowledge. For one thing, as we shall see in detail during this lecture, crowds of clueless and uncomprehending agents can actualize wealth-maximizing outcomes through tentative trading (Smith 1994; Smith 2007, Gjerstad and Smith 2014). Namely, crowds can be rational to some extent. But, for another thing, crowds of clueless and uncomprehending agents can also produce dangerous sociolinguistic institutions that drive up forms of pivotal behavior and group polarization through forms of largescale herding (Tripodi 2018; Dorato 2020). Thus, crowds of clueless and uncomprehending agents can actualize forms of intelligent behavior involuntarily and unintentionally (Surowiecki 2005; Caldwell and Hayek 2014; Epstein 2015). In the same way, those crowds can also act madly and dangerously (Sunstein and Kuran 1999; Akerlof and Shiller 2010; Sunstein 2019a, Sunstein 2019b, Sunstein 2020). Moreover, a so-called nudge can have tremendous corrective effects on dumb behavior (Sunstein and Thaler 2008), whereas tentative and groundless intuitions are sometimes potent drivers of sound judgment and smart behavior (Gigerenzer and Stelten 2002; Gladwell 20 Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads A05; Kahneman and Klein 2009). Interestingly, all these findings point to the fact that the rational aspects of human cognition are strongly linked with one's ability to process contextual variables correctly and deal successfully with information shortages and uncertain contexts. In other words, successful and systematic control of contextual variables is a potent driver of rational thinking and rational behavior (Kahneman et al. 2021; Pinker 2021). In economics and the social sciences, this issue is known as bounded rationality (Simon 1955; 1957; 1983; 1997). Unfortunately, although some of the greatest philosophers extensively delve into these problems (e.g., David Hume, Adam Smith, and even John Maynard Keynes), these research problems have gradually disappeared from philosophical discussions and never returned to their natural home, i.e., philosophy departments. However, in the meantime, the so-called tragedy of the epistemic commons is on the rise because large loads of digital content have an increasing influence on our beliefs and behavior. Indeed, as our beliefs and behavior become increasingly dependent on the streams of digital content we consume daily, rational judgment becomes a rare commodity or perhaps only an ideal type of sound thinking – like in contemporary philosophical writings. In this regard, this lecture reports own empirical findings revealing that intentional manipulations of information in philosophical experiments cause biased philosophical judgments in the same way as large loads of digital content cause biased cognition and behavior. Accordingly, if philosophers' goal is still to provide correct accounts of human cognition, philosophy students and their tutors might benefit from extensive readings of those Classics of Economics that discuss the boundaries of human cognition and expound our knowledge of it.
Abstract: In his Intellectuals and Society (2010, Chap. 11, p. 160), the great American Economist and Political Philosopher Thomas Sowell famously writes: "the seeming sophistication of the notion that all reality is "socially constructed" has a superficial plausibility but it ignores the various validation processes which test those constructions. Much of what is said to be socially "constructed" has been in fact socially evolved over the generations and socially validated by experience. Much of what many among the intelligentsia propose to replace it with is in fact constructed—that is, created deliberately at a given time and place—and with no validation beyond the consensus of like-minded peers. If facts, logic, and scientific procedures are all just arbitrary "socially constructed" notions, then all that is left is consensus—more specifically peer consensus, the kind of consensus that matters to adolescents or to many among the intelligentsia". If we replace the word intelligentsia with the word philosophers in the above quotation, we might get a sense of how and why philosophy has stopped being a trendsetter and has instead become only an academic business much detached from the reality of human affairs. Philosophy practitioners well know that the linguistic and the propositional attitudes turns have drifted philosophy away from a more fundamental research question that Modern Philosophers relentlessly tackled, i.e., what makes our beliefs sound and justified? And what does not? Consequently, much of contemporary Philosophy became a relentless debate rotating around the idea that logic alone validates our beliefs. This lecture aims to resume the guiding research question of Modern Philosophy by approaching it in a non-philosophical manner. More precisely, this lecture reports some seminal findings in Behavioral and Experimental Economics having devastating effects on the view that logic is a belief validator. In fact, although philosophers believe that logic alone drives our everyday beliefs and intentions, the latter literature instead shows that our everyday beliefs and intentions are often deadly traps that lead us into fooling ourselves. Therefore, as a means for rule-based reasoning, logic appears somewhat scarce in our everyday decision-making and mundane knowledge. For one thing, as we shall see in detail during this lecture, crowds of clueless and uncomprehending agents can actualize wealth-maximizing outcomes through tentative trading (Smith 1994; Smith 2007, Gjerstad and Smith 2014). Namely, crowds can be rational to some extent. But, for another thing, crowds of clueless and uncomprehending agents can also produce dangerous sociolinguistic institutions that drive up forms of pivotal behavior and group polarization through forms of largescale herding (Tripodi 2018; Dorato 2020). Thus, crowds of clueless and uncomprehending agents can actualize forms of intelligent behavior involuntarily and unintentionally (Surowiecki 2005; Caldwell and Hayek 2014; Epstein 2015). In the same way, those crowds can also act madly and dangerously (Sunstein and Kuran 1999; Akerlof and Shiller 2010; Sunstein 2019a, Sunstein 2019b, Sunstein 2020). Moreover, a so-called nudge can have tremendous corrective effects on dumb behavior (Sunstein and Thaler 2008), whereas tentative and groundless intuitions are sometimes potent drivers of sound judgment and smart behavior (Gigerenzer and Stelten 2002; Gladwell 20 Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads Ads A05; Kahneman and Klein 2009). Interestingly, all these findings point to the fact that the rational aspects of human cognition are strongly linked with one's ability to process contextual variables correctly and deal successfully with information shortages and uncertain contexts. In other words, successful and systematic control of contextual variables is a potent driver of rational thinking and rational behavior (Kahneman et al. 2021; Pinker 2021). In economics and the social sciences, this issue is known as bounded rationality (Simon 1955; 1957; 1983; 1997). Unfortunately, although some of the greatest philosophers extensively delve into these problems (e.g., David Hume, Adam Smith, and even John Maynard Keynes), these research problems have gradually disappeared from philosophical discussions and never returned to their natural home, i.e., philosophy departments. However, in the meantime, the so-called tragedy of the epistemic commons is on the rise because large loads of digital content have an increasing influence on our beliefs and behavior. Indeed, as our beliefs and behavior become increasingly dependent on the streams of digital content we consume daily, rational judgment becomes a rare commodity or perhaps only an ideal type of sound thinking – like in contemporary philosophical writings. In this regard, this lecture reports own empirical findings revealing that intentional manipulations of information in philosophical experiments cause biased philosophical judgments in the same way as large loads of digital content cause biased cognition and behavior. Accordingly, if philosophers' goal is still to provide correct accounts of human cognition, philosophy students and their tutors might benefit from extensive readings of those Classics of Economics that discuss the boundaries of human cognition and expound our knowledge of it.